This stereotype ex libris book-plate would probably not be of much interest to me except that it was designed by Karel Šimůnek (1869 – 1942), the very same artist who did this lithographic book-plate a copy of which I acquired on 16 July.

I prefer the lithograph, in part because what the woman in the stereotype appears to be doing cannot be good for the book. And, while raised bands on the spine of a book might have peculiar užitečnost to a nemrava, they were an artefact of better-quality book-binding (though sometimes false bands are used to counterfeit such book-binding), and hence of what may be expected to be a more valuable volume.

In his Philosophical Theories of Probability, Donald Gillies proposes what he calls an intersubjective theory of probability. A better name for it would be group-strategy model of probability.

Subjectivists such as Bruno di Finetti ask the reader to consider the following sort of game:

• Some potential event is identified.
• Our hero must choose a real number (negative or positive) q, a betting quotient.
• The nemesis, who is rational, must choose a stake S, which is a positive or negative sum of money or zero.
• Our hero must, under any circumstance, pay the nemesis q·S. (If the product q·S is negative, then this amounts to the nemesis paying money to our hero.)
• If the identified event occurs, then the nemesis must pay our hero S (which, if S is negative, then amounts to taking money from our hero). If it does not occur, then our hero gets nothing.

Di Finetti argues that a rational betting quotient will capture a rational degree of personal belief, and that a probability is exactly and only a degree of personal belief.

Gillies asks us to consider games of the very same sort, except that the betting quotients must be chosen jointly amongst a team of players. Such betting quotients would be at least examples of what Gillies calls intersubjective probabilities. Gillies tells us that these are the probabilities of rational consensus. For example, these are ostensibly the probabilities of scientific consensus.

Opponents of subjectivists such as di Finetti have long argued that the sort of game that he proposes fails in one way or another to be formally identical to the general problem for the application of personal degrees of belief. Gillies doesn't even try to show how the game, if played by a team, is formally identical to the general problem of group commitment to propositions. He instead belabors a different point, which should already be obvious to all of his readers, that teamwork is sometimes in the interest of the individual.

Amongst other things, scientific method is about best approximation of the truth. There are some genuine, difficult questions about just what makes one approximation better than another, but an approximation isn't relevantly better for promoting such things as the social standing as such or material wealth as such of a particular clique. It isn't at all clear who or what, in the formation of genuinely scientific consensus, would play a rôle that corresponds to that of the nemesis in the betting game.

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Karl Popper, who proposed to explain probabilities in terms of objective propensities (rather than in terms of judgmental orderings or in terms of frequencies), asserted that

Causation is just a special case of propensity: the case of propensity equal to 1, a determining demand, or force, for realization.

Gillies joins others in taking him to task for the simple reason that probabilities can be inverted — one can talk both about the probability of A given B and that of B given A, whereäs presumably if A caused B then B cannot have caused A.

Later, for his own propensity theory, Gillies proposes to define probability to apply only to events that display a sort of independence. Thus, flips of coins might be described by probabilities, but the value of a random-walk process (where changes are independent but present value is a sum of past changes) would not itself have a probability. None-the-less, while the value of a random walk and similar processes would not themselves have probabilities, they'd still be subject to compositions of probabilities which we would previously have called probabilities.

In other words, Gillies has basically taken the liberty of employing a foundational notion of probability, and permitting its extension; he chooses not to call the extension probability, but that's just notation. Well, Popper had a foundational notion of propensity, which is a generalization of causality. He identified this notion with probability, and implicitly extended the notion to include inversions.

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Later, Gillies offers dreadful criticism of Keynes. Keynes's judgmental theory of probability implies that every rational person with sufficient intellect and the same information set would ascribe exactly the same probability to a proposition. Gillies asserts

[…] different individuals may come to quite different conclusions even though they have the same background knowledge and expertise in the relevant area, and even though they are all quite rational. A single rational degree of belief on which all rational being should agree seems to be a myth.

So much for the logical interpretation of probability, […].

No two human beings have or could have the same information set. (I am reminded of infuriating claims that monozygotic children raised by the same parents have both the same heredity and the same environment.) Gillies writes of the relevant area, but in the formation of judgments about uncertain matters, we may and as I believe should be informed by a very extensive body of knowledge. Awareness that others might dismiss as irrelevant can provide support for general relationships. And I don't recall Keynes ever suggesting that there would be real-world cases of two people having the same information set and hence not disagreeing unless one of them were of inferior intellect.

After objecting that the traditional subjective theory doesn't satisfactorily cover all manner of judgmental probability, and claiming that his intersubjective notion can describe probabilities imputed by groups, Gillies takes another shot at Keynes:

When Keynes propounded his logical theory of probability, he was a member of an elite group of logically minded Cambridge intellectuals (the Apostles). In these circumstances, what he regarded as a single rational degree of belief valid for the whole of humanity may have been no more than the consensus belief of the Apostles. However admirable the Apostles, their consensus beliefs were very far from being shared by the rest of humanity. This became obvious in the 1930s when the Apostles developed a consensus belief in Soviet communism, a belief which was certainly not shared by everyone else.

Note the insinuation that Keynes thought that there were a single rational degree of belief valid for the whole of humanity, whereäs there is no indication that Keynes felt that everyone did, should, or could have the same information set. Rather than becoming obvious to him in the 1930s, it would have been evident to Keynes much earlier that many of his own beliefs and those of the other Apostles were at odds with those of most of mankind. Gillies' reference to embrace of Marxism in the '30s by most of the Apostles simply looks like irrelevant, Red-baiting ad hominem to me. One doesn't have to like Keynes (as I don't), Marxism (as I don't) or the Apostles (as I don't) to be appalled by this passage (as I am).

There is a hugely important difference between consent within a system and consent to that system.

Some examples:

• Many people object to some matters being decided by bullet; they think that such violence is a Bad Thing. But that doesn't make them hypocrites if they respond to shooting or to the threat of shooting with bullets of their own.
• Some of us object to some things being decided by ballot; we feel that some things (such as the ability of consenting adults to marry) are rights that cannot be taken (though power may be taken) no matter how many people object. But that doesn't make us hypocrites when we respond to voting or to the threat of voting with ballots of our own.
• Quite a few people think that Social Security is a Bad Idea. But that doesn't make them hypocrites if they accept it when offered; they were forced to pay into the system, and they may conclude that refusing to take the money may have no marginal effect on whether it continues.

It is a separate issue whether returning fire, voting in elections that one feels should not be held, or consuming entitlements that one believes should not exist would be wise practical responses; the point is that none of these actions is hypocritical.

Okay, I'm going to presume that all my readers recognize the class of distinction upon which I'm focussing.

So, to-night, I saw NBC News present a report on United States Senators and Representatives who have voted against stimulus bills, yet had subsequently sought to get some of the monies therefrom for their respective districts. The report treated these people as hypocrites. The reporter repeatedly claimed that they'd somehow reversed themselves, and quoted others representing them as hypocrites; and no one was quoted offering any sort of explanation of why this would not be hypocrisy. The only defense quoted was merely that of one congressman, allowed to explain that he thought that seeking monies for which his constituents had paid was in their interests.

For a couple of weeks, I have been in the process of changing the e.mail address that various parties have on file for me. Initially, a considerable amount of each day went into this chore. Now, it's just a few minutes here-and-there, when I am reminded of somewhere that I need to effect a change.

I think that it would probably bore the reader to relate the history of my e.mail addresses, so suffice it to say that I greatly value having a persistent e.mail address, and have had the same address for something on the order of 15 years, but it has been provided by a firm, AT&T, with which I can no longer comfortably do such business. I'll be using oeconomist.com for my email domain now, and hope that I can do so for at least 15 years.

I am visiting my parents because they were using the same firm for e.mail and for their webpage hosting, and are leaving it for similar reasons. I handled configuration of accounts and of e.mail handlers, and transferred WWW content.

I had been using that same firm as my ISP for about that same span, and as my land-line service provider since the acquisition of AT&T by SBC Communications. I have had my land-line disconnected, and turned to Sprint, my cellular telephone service provider, as my ISP. I'm using a Novatel Wireless™ MiFi™ 2200 Mobile Hotspot to connect to the 'Net. For about $100 more, I could have got a Sierra Wireless™ AirCard® W801 (AKA Overdrive™ 3G/4G) Mobile Hotspot, but Sprint doesn't provide and doesn't seem scheduled to provide a 4G network anywhere that I expect to find myself for a few years (after which time there will be new choices in such devices).

Last Monday, I got to meet Charles de Lint, a writer whose work I have long admired, when he came to dinner at my parents' home. He had been there before that day, but not on a day when I had.

My father's profession, writing mostly fantasy, brings him into acquaintances and friendships with some people whom I'd like to meet, or to have met. De Lint had been highest on that list.

Quite some years ago, I damaged both of my knees, especially the left knee (martial arts), and as a consequence I walk with limp. But I none-the-less do a fair amount of walking under normal circumstances. It seems that, as a consequence, I have developed plantar fasciïtis, the plantar fascia being a thick structure of connective tissue in the sole of the foot.

Apparently, I should do less walking for a few months. Additional treatment options include an orthotic support, which I almost certainly should get; stretching exercises, which I am doing; and a night splint, which I will probably get, to keep the foot flexed as one rests. I intend to avoid steroids and surgeory.

The reader may recall that it was a toe of my left foot that I broke last year. In fact, I have chronic tendinitis in my left arm (ancient weight-lifting injury), and within the last few months injured my left shoulder (I don't remember how, because whatever it was didn't much hurt initially) to an extent that the pain became literally nauseous and continues (albeït abated). I am evidently just especially hard on the left side of my body.

If you’re actually trying to install another version of OpenOffice, then click on the OpenOffice tag, as there may be an entry on that other version.

My suggested procedure for installing OpenOffice 3.2.x under RHEL 5.x is essentially the same, mutatis mutandis, as that for installing OpenOffice 3.1.x:

1. If you don't have a JRE installed, then install one. As I write, OpenOffice and Sun are in-synch at update 18, but check with Sun for a more recent version when you are installing OpenOffice. (I suggest that one use jdk-6uxx-linux-xxx-rpm.bin or jre-6uxx-linux-xxx-rpm.bin, rather than jre-6uxx-linux-xxx.bin.) The remainder of these instructions assume that one has a JRE installed.

2. Remove any earlier installation of OpenOffice. As root, enter these three commands:

   rpm -qa | grep openoffice | xargs rpm -e --nodeps
rpm -qa | grep ooobasis | xargs rpm -e --nodeps
rpm -qa | grep fake-db | xargs rpm -e --nodeps

3. Unpack OOo_3.2.x_LinuxIntel_install_wJRE_en-US.tar.gz (or the version appropriate to a devil-language, if you use one of those) to your filespace.

4. Go into resulting OOO32x_mxx_native_packed-x_en-US.xxxx/RPMS/ (or to the OOO32x_mxx_native_packed-x_xx-xx.xxxx/RPMS/ corresponding to your devil-tongue).

5. As root, run

   find . -maxdepth 1 -name "o*.rpm" | xargs rpm -U

6. As root, run

   rpm -U desktop-integration/openoffice.org*-redhat-menus-*.noarch.rpm

   (NB: You may need to log-out and back-in for the Applications menu to be up-dated and list the latest OpenOffice components. Your previous version may continue to be listed on the menu.)

7. As root, run

   rpm -U userland/*.rpm

8. Tell OpenOffice which JRE to use:

   • Launch OpenOffice:

     /usr/bin/openoffice.org3

     (It may not be listed on the applications menu unless you have logged-out and back-in. Before then, you may be able to launch it from the menu by way of a listing for a previous version.)
   • Select

     Tools | Options… | OpenOffice.org | Java | Use a Java runtime environment

   • Choose one of the environments that is then listed.
   • Click the OK button.
   • Shut-down OpenOffice. (The selection of JRE will be in effect upon next launch.)

There's a saying that reäctions depend upon whose ox gets gored, but they also depend upon whose bull does the goring. Had such a programme been suggested by a high-ranking member of the previous Administration, the main-stream media would have directed considerable attention to it and to objections. There are people who will be quite silent now, or will even defend the proposal, who made a habit of furiously denouncing that previous Administration for the mere possibility that it might do such things when third parties suggested that they would.

Probability is one elephant, not two or more formally identical or formally similar elephants.

There's a huge amount of utterly useless meta-discussion in Gillies' book. He writes about his writing without providing any meaningful enlightenment whatsoëver.

An editor should have put his or her foot down, and told Gillies to trim away all this fat. But, again, there doesn't seem to be much editing of books these days, except when done by authors themselves.