The USPS doesn't have enough business, but prices will go up on 11 May. As I said, Basically, officials increase the price per letter in an attempt to off-set the cost per letter which increases as the number of letters decreases because of past price increases. It’s a death-spiral. Added to that now are the effects of the present economic down-turn, but most of the decrease in volume is just a continuation of established trend.

[…] administrative staff positions at the district level nationwide are being reduced by 15 percent. More than 1,400 mail processing supervisor and management positions at nearly 400 facilities around the country also are being eliminated and nearly 150,000 employees nationwide are being given the opportunity to take an early retirement.

Normally, a fair share of early retirees would plan on taking other jobs. In the present economic climate, benefits would have to be higher than otherwise to induce people to take earlier retirement.

In the entry in which I previously discussed tax incidence, I made the point that (setting aside transactions costs) the distributed burden of a per-unit tax is the same regardless of whether the tax is formally imposed upon the buyer or upon the seller or upon both. I didn't, though, explain who then actually bears the burden, because that was irrelevant to where I was going with the entry. But it has preyed upon my mind that I didn't explain that bit.

The answer is that the burden falls most heavily on whichever party is least flexible in response to the monetary price.

Imagine, for example, that buyers, driven by some internal compulsion, must always buy (or try to buy) the same quantity of something, regardless of its price. Price won't necessarily rise without limit, because of competition amongst sellers. If a per-unit tax is formally imposed upon buyers, well, they'd buy that same quantity and then pay the tax on top of what they'd been paying the sellers. Setting aside feelings of pity, or somesuch, the sellers would just shrug. If a per-unit tax is formally imposed upon sellers, then they can otherwise pass along the full cost to their buyers, and competition isn't going to help buyers because the sellers all face the same increase in their costs, so that their calculated optimal prices just increase by the amount of the tax.

On the other hand, if sellers somehow always had to sell the same amount while buyers were flexible, then the shoes would be on the other feet. If the tax is formally imposed upon sellers, then they'd just sell the same amount at the price where quantity demanded absorbed that amount. If the tax is formally imposed upon buyers, well, then buyers are at least going to slightly reduce their consumption unless the sellers cut their prices to fully-offset the tax, so the sellers do this if they must sell that same amount.

When the tax isn't actually per unit, the mathematics and the results can be somewhat messier, but the same underlying dynamics will decide the distribution of the burden.

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In that earlier entry, I said The next time that you hear or read of a politician arguing for employer-provided benefits, such as for health-care, consider the incidence. My primary point at that time was that there may be little or no difference in ultimate burden between a tax formally imposed upon employers and one formally imposed upon employees. But let's pursue the question.

Supposèd advocates of the interests of employees often call for requiring various sorts of employee benefits. At the same time, these alleged advocates tend to model the labor market as if workers have very little choice in their terms of employment. But if, indeed, workers don't have much flexibility, then it will be they who bear most of the cost of the mandated benefits — implicitly they are forced to buy the benefits, rather than spend their wages or salaries on other things.

The accuracy of that characterization of inflexibility will vary across regions, times, and employee-types. All else being equal, it will be less true in times when employers are competing heavily for workers, and more true in times when employees are struggling to find or to keep jobs. Thus, for example, in a recession, employees tend to bear more of the cost of benefits supposedly funded by employers.

Okay, now Barack Obama is a lawyer, and at some point in her life Nancy Pelosi and all or virtually all of the Members of the House of Representatives have been exposed to Article I §8 of the United States Constitution, where it says

No bill of attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed.

But, here the House is passing a bill to effect an ex post facto tax, which if it becomes law will be struck-down by the Supreme Court as unconstitutional. It would be the taxpayers who paid for the hopeless defense of the unconstitutional law, just as they've paid for the time spent for the House to craft and pass this unconstitutional bill. There's no attempt here to protect the money of the taxpayers; there's just a lot of posturing by Congressmen and by the President at the expense of the taxpayers.

The best that ever could have been accomplished would have been to make a precondition of the bail-out money be that those who continued employment with these firms would agree to waive some level of compensation for the previous year. (There'd still be the issue that some recipients have left the employment of these firms, and that others might refuse to waive their compensation even though it would cost the firm the state funds, and some of those who refused might have contracts that precluded their dismissal for such refusal.)

It never so much as occurred to those who designed the bail-outs to attempt to impose even those sorts of preconditions, because they regard themselves and the executives of these firms as part of a same elite, for whose benefit the bail-outs are primarily designed.

In any case, the House of Representatives, with the blessings of the President, is consciously spending money for nothing but political gain.

In economics, when we write or speak of the incidence of a cost or of a benefit, we refer to the ultimate distribution.

Most people get the idea that, often, costs or benefits can be passed along, so that the party upon whom they formally fall isn't necessarily the final recipient. This is certainly true of taxes.

There's a standard result of microëconomics that, if one sets aside the effects of transactions cost (dat ol' debbil), then the incidence of a per-unit tax is same, regardless of whether it is formally placed on the seller or formally placed upon the buyer. Almost every first-term microëconomics course demostrates this result, although they usually dumb-it-down by failing to note that transactions costs can somewhat undermine the equivalence.

The argument goes as follows: Imagine that the quantity offered for sale fits some function S(P_s) where P_s is the price received by the seller, and that quantity that buyers seek fits some function D(P_b) where P_b is the price that buyers must pay. If the pre-tax price is just P, and sellers have to pay additional tax and tax-related costs of t_s, and buyers have to pay tax and tax-related costs of t_b, then

P_s = P - t_s

(tax-related cost subtracted because it is a reduction in the price that what the seller receives) and

P_b = P + t_b

(tax-related cost added because it is an increase in how much the buyer must pay). Algebraïcally,

P_b = P_s + t_s + t_b

and

P_s = P_b - t_b - t_s

And the market would equilibrate where

S(P_s) = D(P_b)

(At a lower P, D would be greater than S, and it would be in the interest of sellers to increase their prices or of buyers to offer a little more per unit; and, a higher P, S would be greater than D, and it would be in the interest of sellers to cut their prices a bit, or for potential buyers to cut the amount that they offered.) Which is to say that the equilibrium is

S(P_s) = D(P_s + t_s + t_b)

as if the buyer formally paid all the tax on the seller's received price, and

S(P_b - t_b - t_s) = D(P_b)

as if the seller formally paid all the tax on the buyer's paid price.

(The next time that you hear or read of a politician arguing for employer-provided benefits, such as for health-care, consider the incidence.)

Now, let's consider the incidence of a tax on carbon emissions (ignoring the question of whether there should be such a tax), in the absense of transactions costs, the incidence would be the same whether the state formally taxed the producer of the emissions, or taxed the consumer of each product associated with the emissions, based upon the amount of the emission associated with that product. But it is plainly less costly to place the formal tax on the producer than to have separate filings for each consumer.

Which brings me to this story:

Whatever measures are imposed to curtail carbon emissions, they can be conceptualized as a tax. And it's really, folks, not that the Chinese officials don't understand that the incidence would be the same (or very nearly the same) in the absence of transactions costs, nor that they don't recognize that the transactions costs would be lower if the tax were formally imposed upon producers. Rather, it's that the Chinese state

• knows that some consuming nations would avoid or evade the tax, lowering the incidence upon China,
• would be able to disguise some of its emissions for domestically consumed production as emissions for exported product, and
• would like to misdirect blame for any failure to reach agreement.

Yester-day, I got hit with a significant wave of depression. I'd been trying to dodge it, but it got me.

My parents are expecting a visit from me; in fact, they expected me to have driven there by sometime yester-day. But I've not got my ducks in-a-row to travel, and right now I'd rather just curl-up in a ball for a while.

One of the things that really upsets me in such a context is when people throw-away my maybe. I tell them that I plan to do something or hope to do something or some-such, and some people act as if I've said that I will or even shall do it. I generally choose my words, even in extemporaneous conversation, fairly carefully, and I resent people ignoring what I've said with the result of a spuriously implied commitment, even if they don't themselves recognize the implication.

I've been taking another run at Subjective Probability: The Real Thing (2004) by Richard C. Jeffrey. I'd started reading it a while back, but got distracted. Anyway, Jeffrey was an important subjectivist — someone who argued that probability is a measure of belief, and that any degree of belief that does not violate certain rationality constraints is permitted. (As I have noted earlier, the subjectivism here is in the assignment of quantities not specifically required by objective criteria. The subjectivists believe either that quantity by reason must be assigned, albeït often arbitrarily, or that Ockham's Razor is not a binding constraint.) And the posthumous Subjective Probability was his final statement.

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At some point, I encountered the following entry in the index:

Nozick, Robert, 119, 123

which entry was almost immediately annoying. Page 119 is in the References section, and indeed has the references for Nozick, but that's a pretty punk thing to drop in an index. Even more punk would be an index entry that refers to itself; and, indeed, page 123 is in the index, and it is on that page that one finds Nozick, Robert, 119, 123.

Well, actually, I'd forgot something about this book, which is probably an artefact of its being posthumous: Most or all of the index entries are off by ten pages, such that one ought to translate Nozick, Robert, 119, 123 to Nozick, Robert, 109, 113. And, yes, there are references to Nozick on those pages (which are part of a discussion of Newcomb's Problem and of related puzzles). It was just chance-coïncidence that ten pages later one found the listings in the references and in the index.

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In decision theory, there are propositions call independence axiomata. The first such proposition to be explicitly advanced for discussion (in an article by Paul Anthony Samuelson) is the Strong Independence Axiom, the gist of which is that the value of a reälized outcome is independent of the probability that it had before it was reälized. Say that we had a lottery of possible outcomes X₁, X₂,… X_n, each X_i having associated probability p_i. If we assert that the expected value of this lottery were

Σ[p_i · u(X_i)]

where u( ) is some utility function, then (amongst other things) we've accepted an independence proposition. Otherwise, we may have to assert something such as that the expect value were

Σ[p_i · u(X_i,p_i)]

to account for such things as people taking an unlikely million dollars to be somehow better than a likely million dollars.

Anyway, there's another proposition which to most of us doesn't look like the Strong Independence Axiom, and yet is pretty much the same thing, the Sure Thing Principle, which is associated with Leonard Jimmie Savage (an important subjectivist, whom I much admire, and with whom I markèdly disagree). Formally, it's thus:

{[(A ∧ B) pref C] ∧ [(A ∧ ¬B) pref C]} ⇒ (A pref C)

Less formally,

If the combination of A and B is preferred to C, and the combination of A without B is preferred to C, then A is just plain preferred to C, regardless of B.

Savage gives us the example of a businessman trying to decide whether to buy a piece of property with an election coming-up. He thinks-through whether he would be better off with the property if a Democrat is elected, and decides that he would prefer that he had bought the property in that case. He thinks-through whether he would be better off with the property if a Republican is elected, and decides that he would prefer that he had bought the property in that case. So he buys the property. This seems very reasonable.

But there is a famous class of counter-examples, presented by Jeffrey in the form of the case of the Marlboro Man. The hypothetical Marlboro Man is trying to decide whether to smoke. He considers that, if he should live a long life, he would wish at its end that he had enjoyed the pleasure of smoking. He considers that, if he should live a short life, he would wish at its end that he had enjoyed the pleasure of smoking. So he smokes. That doesn't seem nearly so reasonable.

There is an underlying difference between our two examples. The businessman would not normally expect his choice to affect the outcome of the election; the Marlboro Man ought to expect his choice to affect the length of his life. Jeffrey asserts that Savage only meant the Sure Thing Principle to hold in cases where the probability of B were independent of A.

But what makes the discussion poignant is this: Jeffrey, dying of surfeit of Pall Malls, wrote this book as his last, and passed-away from lung cancer on 9 November 2002.

Previously, I wrote of how a Jack Black® Pure Performance Shave Brush, with synthetic bristles, proved to be far better than the Burma Shave™ boar-bristle brush that I had been using.

I said that I would probably try, for the sake of comparison, an Art of Shaving® badger-bristle brush that I had, and there was some interest in my doing so.

That badger-bristle brush is not of the highest grade. Above it would be the best badger, and better than the best would be the silvertip badger. I'm not going to be trying a best brush or a silvertip brush, because I'm not going to contribute to the the deaths of more badgers. (Again, I got my boar-bristle brush in a state of ignorance, and my badger bristle brush was likewise got by someone who didn't know that badgers were killed for the bristles.) FWIW, I've read that there isn't much difference between an ordinary badger-bristle shave brush and a best badger-bristle shave brush, but that there is a remarkable difference between a silvertip brush and a best badger-bristle shave brush.

In any event, I found the Art of Shaving® badger-bristle brush much better than the Burma Shave™ boar-bristle brush, but the Jack Black® synthetic-bristle brush significantly better than the Art of Shaving® brush.

The Art of Shaving® brush still irritated my skin somewhat. I don't know to what extent that was a result of the overt texture of the bristles and to what extent it was an allergic reäction or something like an allergic reäction. The Black brush has no such effect.

Both the badger brush and the the Black brush have a much greater tendency to hold water than does the boar brush.

I've only tried the badger brush and the Black brush with a hard cake shaving soap. (I once tried the boar brush with a thick shaving cream from Lush, but that the experiment suggested that that stuff shouldn't be applied with a brush at all.) I have other shaving soaps with which I can experiment later, but I don't mean to conductive extensive further comparisons of these brushes.

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For those who are interested, here is a list of the synthetic shave brushes of which I am aware:

• Jack Black Pure Performance Shave Brush
• Body Shop
• Culmak
• Delong (see also Delong brush heads)
• Gentleman's Shop
• Edwin Jagger
• Men-Ü (in America) (outside of America)
• Mühle: classic & modern
• L'Occitane
• Omega
• R.A. Rooney
• Cyril R. Salter (apparently same product as Rooney)
• Taylor of Old Bond Street (NB: Brushes simply marked imitation may contain some natural hair.)

Many of them have been reviewed at Badger & Blade.

A pH change of .24 of the oceans is definitely cause for concern. However, the natural pH of seawater is 8.2, well into the alkaline range, and reducing that by something between .24 and .45 would mean that the ocean were still in the alkaline range (though quite worryingly less). So the headline here

and much of the rhetoric within the body of the article is just rot.

As to the suggestion that the pH will be lowered by as much as .35, it comes from the IPCC, so caveat lector.

A minor prediction: Over the next few weeks, news stories about the economy are going to make increasing reference to Joseph Alois Schumpeter.

Schumpeter was an economist from the Austrian School. His theory of the business cycle was, however, distinct from that which has come to be seen as the Austrian School theory of business cycles (which theory I will not labor here). Schumpeter believed that economic crises were processes of creative destruction, whereby economies restructured in consequences of accepting pent-up innovations (typically technological) incompatible with the existing order, but ultimately beneficial.

Unless this theory is in some way trivialized, it does not explain the present crisis; but I none-the-less expect various journalists and alleged economists to pitch exactly the idea that it does. And I would actually not be surprised for the economy to emerge significantly restructured, but that would be more a matter of a sort of economic gerrymandering by the Democratic Party, taking advantage of the crisis.

Back in April, I noted that some advocates of the theory of global warming had modified their theory to allow for climate to actually cool for up to a decade (after which the ostensible warming trend would resume). There has been a further adjustment:

(Underscore mine.) So, now, for at least the next thirty years, no matter what the temperature data say, the theory of global warming isn’t to be taken as falsified.