Back when Barack Obama and John McCain had selected their respective running-mates for the Presidential race, a 'Net friend wrote

[…] it does seem that Obama picked the best person to help him govern, whereas McCain picked the best person to help him win.

which was certainly a plausible interpretation of the choice (so long as we tweak it to refer to the expectations of Obama and of McCain).

Now Obama has nominated an appointee to the Supreme Court who is unlikely to sway other judges in favor of left-wing opinion:

Sotomayor has infamously asserted

I would hope that a wise Latina woman with the richness of her experiences would more often than not reach a better conclusion than a white male who hasn’t lived that life.

Well, the logician in me wants to point out that the decisions of any wise person (Latina or otherwise) can be be expected to be better over-all than the decisions of a typical person (white and male or otherwise); wisdom simply isn't typical. So if Sotomayor hadn't implicitly inserted a second wise in front of white male, then she would have expressed something basically true but close-on to vacuous, and cluttered-up with inappropriate adjectives.

Unfortunately, she was arguing against the claim that a wise old man and wise old woman will reach the same conclusion in deciding cases, so she was arguing for a sort of sexism, at least a sexism conditional upon race.

In any case, the problem is that Sotomayor herself isn't wise. That leaves the (somewhat redundant) Latina woman part. That part wouldn't help her to reach better decisions or even to argue effectively for whatever judgments she reached, but it would help the Democrats in future elections and help Obama in particular.

(The Republicans are in poor position to complain about such a selection. When running for President in 1980, Ronald Reagan promised that his first nominee to the SCotUS would be a woman. Worse, the woman whom he nominated was Sandra Day O'Connor, whose judicial philosophy, such as it was, was baddumbmommism — an insistence on ending specific conflicts by imposing pragmatic compromise.)

There isn't a whole lot to be said about this decision.

The ruling declared that

It is not a proper function of this court to curtail that process; we are constitutionally bound to uphold it.

But, in fact, the process specified by the state constitution does not allow any-and-all amendments that can find support amongst a plurality of voters. The court chose to put democracy ahead both of the constitution and of personal freedom.

Back in December, I drew attention to:

Now: Again, the big story is right there, but being ignored: The FBI set-out to covertly bring-down a Presidential Administration. Now we see that two major papers were positioned to recognize this, and each concealed this coup from the public.

In 1992, Tim Burton made a movie, Batman Returns, in which his alleged Batman sees a woman fall from a ledge on a building. The supposed Batman waddles to the edge, looks over, and watches her fall to her death.

If the actual Batman sees a woman tossed from a building then he immediately jumps after her pushes off something because she's been accelerating under gravity and figures-out what he'll do on the way down because he's the g_dd_mn'd Batman, when there's no hope…

…except him.

Moon of the Wolf, by Len Wein, Neal Adams, and Dick Giordano, from Batman #255 (April 1974), is reproduced at a Grantbridge Street entry for 18 May.

How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it.

Thus begins Adam Smith's first book, in its editions of 1759, 1761, 1767, 1774, 1781, and 1790. In other words, he was saying this both before and after his more famous work, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1776, 1778, 1784, 1786, & 1789). At some point, I may write a lengthier entry on what Smith was doing with the Wealth of Nations, but I wanted to make the point that Smith didn't make his case for a free market based upon a personal belief that one only cared for others based upon their effects on one's own material well-being. Rather, he made his case (in the Wealth of Nations) for the optimality of a free market without availing himself of the proposition that people otherwise gave a d_mn about each other. Then, as now, many opponents of a free society held that an economy without extensive state control could work only if people had more fellow-feeling than they actually do.

Those who used to follow my LJ (long since deleted and purged) might recall that I find Rush Limbaugh deeply offensive, and began actively avoiding listening to him after he blamed the 1992 Los Angeles riots on Rodney King.

But is it funny to accuse Limbaugh of treason for expressing a hope that the Administration fails in its programmes of state expansion? Is it funny to suggest that Limbaugh is a henchman of Osama bin Laden? Is it funny to express a hope that Limbaugh suffer from kidney failure?

Apparently our current President thinks that it is.

There should never have been any acceptance of the entwined notions that bald hatred, utterly lacking cleverness, counts as comedy, and that so long as it's labelled as comedy it somehow doesn't count as hatred.

I have posted one entry to this 'blog that made reference to Cournot-Nash equilibria, and I expect to write another soon. I'm going to use this entry to explain the concept of a Cournot-Nash equilibrium, without resorting to mathematical formulæ.

First, let me give my favorite example of the idea, the behavior of prairie dog mothers in at least some towns. Prairie dogs are omnivores; they are primarily herbivorous, but will also consume small animals such as insects. If a prairie dog mother stays away from her litter of pups, they are liable to be eaten by something, so she will prefer food that is close at-hand — such as the pups of another mother who is away from her burrow. In fact, in some towns, when pups are eaten, it is usually by mothers trying to get home before their own pups are eaten. If any one prairie dog were to stop eating pups while the others continued, then her own pups would more likely be eaten because she'd be away from home for longer or more frequent periods. They eat each other's babies because they eat each other's babies.

Some of you may be thinking of the Prisoners' Dilemma, which, under classic assumptions, results in a similar mess. It too is an example of a Cournot-Nash equilibrium.

The essence of a Cournot-Nash equilibrium is that each participant has no incentive to change behavior unless other players change behavior, so each — and thus every — participant sticks with his or her established behavior. Although the prairie dog example and the classic telling of the Prisoners' Dilemma are sub-optimal equilibria, it could be the case that an equilibrium were the best-possible equilibrium, and no one had an incentive to change his or her behavior so long as no one else changed his or her behavior; so it's important to distinguish optimal Cournot-Nash equilibria from sub-optimal Cournot-Nash equlibria.

The Nash to whom the name refers is John Forbes Nash jr, whose life and work were grossly misrepresented in the movie A Beautiful Mind (2001). Nash's most famous accomplishment was explicitly generalizing and formalizing the idea of a Cournot-Nash equilibrium, which some simply call a Nash equilibrium. But there were famous antecedent uses of the idea, the best-known of which was by Antoine Augustin Cournot, in an 1838 model of oligopolistic competition.[1]

A less-often recognized antecedent use was by Thomas Hobbes in Leviathan (1651). Hobbes famously proposes that, in the absence of a State, life will be nasty, brutish, and short. More specifically, he said

Hereby it is manifest that during the time men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called war; and such a war as is of every man against every man. For war consisteth not in battle only, or the act of fighting, but in a tract of time, wherein the will to contend by battle is sufficiently known: and therefore the notion of time is to be considered in the nature of war, as it is in the nature of weather. For as the nature of foul weather lieth not in a shower or two of rain, but in an inclination thereto of many days together: so the nature of war consisteth not in actual fighting, but in the known disposition thereto during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary. All other time is peace.

Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of war, where every man is enemy to every man, the same consequent to the time wherein men live without other security than what their own strength and their own invention shall furnish them withal. In such condition there is no place for industry, because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no culture of the earth; no navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by sea; no commodious building; no instruments of moving and removing such things as require much force; no knowledge of the face of the earth; no account of time; no arts; no letters; no society; and which is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.[2]

According to Hobbes, without the State, production is subject to predation, so potential producers have less incentive to produce and everyone has incentive to prey upon everyone else.

But Hobbes has also identified a special case of one solution to what would otherwise be a sub-optimal Cournot-Nash equilibrium. In Leviathan, men end the war amongst them by explicitly agreeing to the creätion of an institution (the State) which will change the equilibrium. More generally, agreements need not be explicit or conscious, and the transforming institution could be a code of conduct. For example, the classic statement of the Prisoners' Dilemma treats the game as played in a social vacuum of a sort. In real life, people build reputations, reward desired behaviors, and punish the behaviors to which they object. Commitment mechanisms don't necessarily free us from every possible sub-optimal Cournot-Nash equlibrium, but naïve game theory too often fails to consider their possibility. (There was some perverse gloating in A Beautiful Mind about how Nash had somehow refuted Adam Smith, but the liberal order of which Smith wrote is filled with commitment mechanisms. Private property itself is an example of such a mechanism.)

Perhaps, in time, even the prairie dogs will evolve a mechanism such that eating each other's pups is no longer an equilibrium.

---

[1] Recherches sur les principes mathématiques de la théorie des richesses, Ch 7.

[2] Chapter XIII ¶ 8-9.

Yester-day, I again encountered the slogan No Blood for Oil!, made popular in the run-up to the invasion of Iraq.

I greatly doubt that the people who embrace this slogan have much thought about what it would really mean to forswear the use of violence over economic resources. Only a tiny minority are truly prepared to do that.

This proposition should be obvious in the case of those who want the State to actively participate in decisions about the allocation of resources. The point in having the State determine what quantities will be produced or to whom or to what production will go, or at what prices goods or services will be sold is to use violence or a threat of violence, effected by police and by prison guards. Were the economic administration to be by friendly persuasion, it could be done without the State.

Removing the State as an active participant doesn't utterly remove violence from the equation. If one believes that individuals or communities may forceably defend acquisition, retention, or distribution of goods or of services, then one accepts the use of violence over economic resources. It doesn't matter whether the forceable defense is provided by the State, by private protection agencies, by mobs, or by rugged individualists.

So if one believes that the state should provide the poor with home heating oil, or control gasoline prices, or if one believes in forceably defendable private property in petroleum or in forceably defendable anarcho-socialistic management of petroleum, then one believes in trading blood for oil.

In order to genuinely reject such an exchange, one would have to be truly and utterly pacifistic about petroleum, as are the Amish (albeït that a petroleum pacifist might be violent about other things).

Now, I surely don't claim that the United States should ever use its military in an attempt to secure foreign sources of goods or of services. (We can set aside debate over what the actual relationship were of the invasion of Iraq to American dependence upon Middle Eastern petroleum.) But simple-minded slogans and ad hoc moralizations don't typically propel discourse or move convictions in a humane direction.

Years ago, a friend of mine used to regularly listen to right-wing talk radio. (I imagine that he still does.) I was often a passenger in his car, and there usually had to listen to this programming as well. What I heard drove me up a wall. These commentators didn't usually target people with whose views I agreed, but they routinely misrepresented the arguments that were used by their opponents, made ridiculous universalizations or near-universalizations about the motivations of these opponents, and pretended that the only alternatives to the views of the political left were those of the political right. And the abiding emotion was hate.

For the past few days, I have been visiting my parents. Nearly every evening, they watch MSNBC, and I catch some of it whenever I visit them. What I hear drives me up a wall. The commentators of MSNBC don't usually target people with whose views I agree, but they routinely misrepresent the arguments that have been used by their opponents, make ridiculous universalizations or near-universalizations about the motivations of these opponents, and pretend that the only alternative to the views of the political right are those of the political left. And the abiding emotion is hate.

For example, during this latest visit, I heard Rachel Maddow mocking William Kristol as ostensibly claiming a few weeks into the invasion of Iraq that the war was won, when what Kristol had actually said was that every battle had been decisively won. Were I now to claim that, a few weeks into the American Civil War, every battle had been decisively won by the Confederacy, I would plainly not be claiming that the Confederacy had won the war.

(Maddow was more generally concerned to pretend that the neoconservatives were trying to reposition and to repackage themselves as supporters of the war policy of the Obama Administration. The truth is that, in actual practice, this policy far more closely resembles that of the later Bush Administration than it does the policy described during the Obama candidacy. The neoconservatives, then, don't have to reposition much, though they plainly need to repackage if they are to regain active influence, since their persons and past organizations are anathematized.)

On top of being bothered by all this hate and misrepresentation in-and-of-itself, I am bothered that my father seems to be at least amused by this rubbish, and that my mother sort-of waves-away the fact that there's a stream of misrepresentation, and refuses to acknowledge that the hate is on a par with that of right-wing talk radio.

I end-up closing myself into the principal guest room, away from the television but also then away from my parents.

Amendment (2009:04/10): My father stated, last night, that while my mother likes Rachel Maddow, he finds Maddow unpleasant. Now, if only he would reject some of the other folk on MSNBC.

This story

is not getting much attention from the main-stream media.

I will be working on a Gadsden-flag bumper-sticker for my car.