Archive for the ‘commentary’ Category

Gloom of Night

Wednesday, 27 February 2008

The Woman of Interest alerted me to the fact that the USPS will be increasing its rates again in May. A one-ounce, first-class stamp will cost another US$0.01.

The problem here is that the Postal Service long-ago passed the point where each increase in price caused a drop in total revenues, as people began switching first to facsimile machines and, more recently, to e.mail. And officials report their expenses as continuing to climb, which shows that they're not paring dis·economies of scale. Basically, officials increase the price per letter in an attempt to off-set the cost per letter which increases as the number of letters decreases because of past price increases. It's a death-spiral.

Post officials have long been told, and surely recognize, where things are headed. They probably feel that there would be little for them but grief in attempting at this point to promote the reforms that could get the the Postal Service off its present path.

My expectation is that we will eventually be told that privatization failed, that the Postal Service will stop pretending to be a firm, and that its prices and services will be determined by political and bureaucratic notions of necessity and of justice, with overt subsidies off-setting ever-increasing deficits.

The past is a foreign country: they do things differently there. — Leslie Poles Hartley

Wednesday, 27 February 2008

I was looking at a recent photograph on-line, and noticed that one of the walls in the background was pastel green. It struck me that pastel green is a color that was very popular in the '50s and in the '60s, but since the '70s almost complete absent from every-day life except for vintage appliances and furniture.

Nor does it seem to be a color popular amongst those who otherwise enjoy such items. I certainly don't miss it; I wouldn't much care to have any of those pastel green vintage items in my home. But those attempting to recreäte the authentic look-and-feel of 40-to-50 years ago probably should make greater use of it.

Another 'Bot-'Blog

Tuesday, 26 February 2008

A 'bot has again commented to one of my entries, linking back to its 'blog; this time at mediadistricts.com. The style of the entries at that 'blog show some trivial improvements over the style that I described earlier. Now the form is

[source-'blog name] wrote an [variable adjective] blog post today on [entry title]
Here’s a [variable adjective-noun]
[random quotation]
[variable text] [variable linked text]

The previous 'blog was registered by over proxy. This time, there appears to be an unproxied registrant:

Roseanna M. Hallman
12328 HOLLYHOCK CT
WOODBRIDGE VA 22192-2001
(703) 490-2260

who apparently has about 86 domains.

'Bot-'Blogs

Monday, 25 February 2008

By virtue of a 'bot commenting to a prior entry, I discovered a 'bot-maintained set of advertising sites at weblog4all.info, each guised as a 'blog. The 'bot-or-'bots (I suspect that there is just one) find(s) entries in 'blogs or in 'blog-like pages, and then creätes an entry in one of its own 'blogs (eg iraq.weblog4all.info) of form

[source-'blog name] wrote an interesting post today on [entry title]
Here’s a quick excerpt
[random quotation]
For more information, click here

Each page of the 'bot-'blogs also has many links to videos, which are hosted on an advertising-supported site or sites.

Ringer

Sunday, 24 February 2008

I can offer a few theories as to why Ralph Nader has announced that he will once again run for President.

The first, and that to which I subscribe, is that he takes some sort of perverse pleasure in functioning as a spoiler. Whatever were his intentions in 2000, he was a spoiler for Gore, which resulted in the election of George Walker Bush. Nader had less of a chance to spoil things for the Democrats in 2004, and certainly less of a chance to move the Democratic Party to the political left, but he could and did spoil things for the Green Party, destroying them by running against their candidate. In 2008, Nader doesn't have a good chance of spoiling things for the Democratic nominee, but it's better than were his chances in 2004; McCain is not as loathed by the left as was Bush.

An alternate theory would be that Nader is trying to give Obama some center cred, on the presumption that Obama will indeed be the nominee. Seeking first the nomination of the Democratic Party, Hillary Clinton and Obama have each positioned themselves significantly to the left of where the last successful Democratic Presidential nominee, William Jefferson Clinton, did when he was running. McCain is a war-hawk, and a conservative on some issues, but he is a centrist or even to the left of center on other issues. To win the election, the Democratic nominee will have to seem more centrist than presently does Obama or Hillary Clinton. On top of some rhetorical restyling by the candidate, it could help if Nader provided apparent contrast.

Of course, Nader is more likely to function as a spoiler if Hillary Clinton is the nominee, because she has at times been a war-hawk, and there is less expectation that she would withdraw troops aggressively from Iraq than that Obama would do this. So it is possible that Nader has announced when he has in order to further weaken the Clinton campaign. In that case, we have Nader acting as a spoiler of some sort for Clinton (and possibly for the Democratic Party), and positioning himself to make Obama look more centrist should he gain the nomination.

Jevons' Paradox

Saturday, 23 February 2008

One of the means by which some propose to reduce petroleum consumption is increased technological efficiency. The idea is that if it takes less oil to accomplish our tasks, then we will want and need less oil. However, let's turn that around. If it takes fewer liters of oil to accomplish a given task, then we can accomplish more with a given liter. So what's actually going to happen?

Consider how we normally decide how much of a good or service to buy at any given price, or how much we would be willing to pay for any given quantity of that good or service. Whenever we buy a unit, we are spending money that could be spend on other things. If we are rational, then we decide whether to forgo those other things based upon what they'd do for us, compared to what the unit in question would do for us. All else being equal, the more use (of some sort) that we can get out of that unit, the more that we are willing to forgo of other things. And if something causes the usefulness of a sort of good or service to increase, then we're willing to pay more for it than earlier, and we want to buy more of it at any given price than we would earlier.

It really doesn't matter whether the new usefulness is from an intrinsic change or from an extrinsic change. In other words, if a good or service just itself changes to become more useful (in which case, it's really no longer the same good or service), then we want it more; or if the context changes to allow more to be done with the good or service, then we want it more.

If all of our engines that use petroleum products were magically transformed to do more work-per-gallon — so that petroleum became more useful — then we'd want and use more petroleum.

Here we have the essence of what is called Jevons' Paradox. William Stanley Jevons (one of the preceptors of the Marginal Revolution), in his book The Coal Question (1865), noted that Watts' improvements on the design of the steam engine (so that it could do more work per ton) had been followed by a great increase in the consumption of coal in such engines. The generalization is that, as technological change diminishes the amount of a resources necessary to perform a given task, consumption of that resource may increase.

Note that the point is not merely that the resources left-over by efficiency found use elsewhere, but that efficiency increased over-all use. (I make this point because I've seen Jevons' Paradox misrepresented as if claiming that supply were constant at all prices.)

There's actually not much paradoxical about the alleged paradox; like most economics, it is explained by common sense applied with uncommon care.

So why, then, do petroleum producers join in the protests against legislation mandating greater efficiency? Well, for much the same reason as do the automobile manufacturers. You surely noticed my phrases above, all else being equal and magically transformed. If the technological change mandated by legislation were costless, then industry would rush to adopt it, with or without legislation. But, for industry to want to adopt a technology that has a cost, it has to increase the usefulness of the good or service with a value at least equal to that cost. Otherwise, the increased costs will cut manufacturer profits, in part through reduced sales of automobiles. And it's the latter — fewer cars — that worries the petroleum producers.

Now, one might then say Well, then increased technological efficiency can reduce petroleum consumption, if only in this round-about way! But it really isn't the efficiency that's reducing consumption; it's just the cost. If the same cost were imposed by simply slapping an additional tax on automobiles, petroleum consumption would go down more, because the increased cost wouldn't even be partially offset by greater usefulness from technological efficiency.

It Is the Soldier

Wednesday, 20 February 2008

I've been pondering ideological taxonomy again.

As a classical liberal, I believe that there is a right-or-wrong prior to any actual human choice or action. A standard term for this preëxisting morality is natural law. Classical liberals typically test their notions of natural law by pondering how they would work in a state of nature — that is to say in a hypothetical environment when social institutions have been zeroed-out.

But what I've been pondering lately isn't classical liberalism per se, but conservatism — how it proceeds from a different foundational model, and how that that model affects (or effects) the politics of to-day.

Some conservatives have explained the essential difference between conservatism and liberalism (by which they may mean classical liberalism, or the social democratism that absconded with the name liberal in the 20th Century, or both) in that liberals did not believe in Original Sin. What one perhaps first sees here is a rejection of human perfectability; but there's something darker here.

There's a famous poem by Charles M. Province, It Is the Soldier, which declares that our freedoms and rights are not given to us by ministers, by reporters, by poets, by campus organizers, by lawyers, or by politicians, but by soldiers. The declaration is not merely that the front-line of defense of these rights is provided by the soldier, but that these rights are literally given to us by the soldier. In what sort of framework does the soldier give these rights to us?

Thomas Hobbes wrote of a state of nature in which rights as most of us now conceptuälize them did not exists. Hobbes indeed uses the word right, but it doesn't refer to anything that morally constrains others; rather, it is an obligation of some sort binding its possessor, and in this case binding him to follow a lex naturalis which is of every man for himself:

The right of nature, which writers commonly call jus naturale, is the liberty each man hath to use his own power as he will himself for the preservation of his own nature; that is to say, of his own life; and consequently, of doing anything which, in his own judgement and reason, he shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto. By liberty is understood, according to the proper signification of the word, the absence of external impediments; which impediments may oft take away part of a man's power to do what he would, but cannot hinder him from using the power left him according as his judgement and reason shall dictate to him. A law of nature, lex naturalis, is a precept, or general rule, found out by reason, by which a man is forbidden to do that which is destructive of his life, or taketh away the means of preserving the same, and to omit that by which he thinketh it may be best preserved. For though they that speak of this subject use to confound jus and lex, right and law, yet they ought to be distinguished, because right consisteth in liberty to do, or to forbear; whereas law determineth and bindeth to one of them: so that law and right differ as much as obligation and liberty, which in one and the same matter are inconsistent.

And because the condition of man (as hath been declared in the precedent chapter) is a condition of war of every one against every one, in which case every one is governed by his own reason, and there is nothing he can make use of that may not be a help unto him in preserving his life against his enemies; it followeth that in such a condition every man has a right to every thing, even to one another's body. And therefore, as long as this natural right of every man to every thing endureth, there can be no security to any man, how strong or wise soever he be, of living out the time which nature ordinarily alloweth men to live. And consequently it is a precept, or general rule of reason: that every man ought to endeavour peace, as far as he has hope of obtaining it; and when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek and use all helps and advantages of war. The first branch of which rule containeth the first and fundamental law of nature, which is: to seek peace and follow it. The second, the sum of the right of nature, which is: by all means we can to defend ourselves.

Now, Hobbes would still be interesting if we discarded the famous stuff about life in a state of nature being nasty, brutish, and short — he'd got hold of the notion of sub-optimal Cournot-Nash equilibria being overcome by introduction of a commitment mechanism — but that business of life being thus wasn't simply grim speculation of how things would be, but an interpretation of how things had been; and, hence, on a deeper level, of how things were and always will be.

Consider the pre-feudal period in Western Europe, and feudalism in theory. Outside of the major cities, the central Roman state provided ever-weakening protection against raiders. (Indeed, to the extent that the state acted upon the country side, it was as itself a looter of a sort.) Those with sufficient resources and leadership abilities put together their own gangs (perhaps cobbled-together from the remains of the state). These gangs might themselves function as no more than local protection rackets, seizing tribute in exchange for protecting weaker people from nothing other than worse seizures by the gang itself, while protecting only themselves from other raiders. But in theory what the local gang did was to hold back those raiders, in exchange for goods or services from those who were subordinates of the leader of the gang.

As it evolved, the ideology of feudalism didn't present the gang simply as providing service-for-hire. Rather, the gang-leader was presented as himself the owner of the land and of what it produced. He granted use of this property, in exchange for stewardship.

Look at this model of the world. The community is under constant menace from external raiders. The warrior holds back those raiders; by virtue of this, he makes the community possible. All rights within the community are thus creäted by him, and any rights possessed by others have thus been granted by him — It is the Soldier.

Aside from ostensibly protecting the locals, the other engagement of the lord was in, well, raiding some other community. In fact, even when feudalism was operating according to theory, the immediate reason that each community needed a lord was that other communities had lords of their own. But, within this framework of rights being creäted by the soldier, there is nothing wrong with this — after all, the rights of the other community ostensibly were brought into existence by warriors to whom the raiders owe nothing! (And savages, who do not have a proper leader, are especially regarded as fair game, for they have no rights from anyone.)

Conservatisms emerge from and are informed by various things, including a respect for subtleties of social evolution. But I think that this model of civilization as carved-out of barbarism and always threatened by barbarism plays much the same rôle for most of them as do the thought-experiments of the classical liberals for them. The classical liberal begins with a perhaps romanticized model of the state of nature, to think about natural law, and adds barbarians (if at all) as a complication of the model; the conservative begins by imagining barbarism, and subsequently perhaps romanticizes the warriors who carve territories from it.

Even if I am wrong in this belief about conservatism, I think that a useful taxonomy could classify ideologies by what thought, if any, they gave to states of nature.

I have a conservative friend whose take on Dirty Harry was significantly different from my own. He saw men such as Callahan as dirty because such men must be, in order that there be civilization for the rest of us. In hindsight, I reälize that it was natural for my friend, qua conservative, to read things thus — it's a variation on the theme of barbarians (the Scorpio Killer) and of warriors (Callahan) who are required and thus empowered to do terrible things to stop them, though these warriors may be sickened by what they are doing.

(Though I have left him here unnamed, in justice I should draw attention to the point that my conservative friend indeed saw Callahan as dirty; my friend would by no means join and worship in a cult of the military. He speaks of soldiers wanting to be honored with parades every day, in what I take to be a metaphor for their propensity to mistake an essential contribution for a uniquely essential contribution.)

Almost every war-time Presidential Administration has tapped into the presumption that war suspends the ordinary rules. (That is, after all, why war is declared by these and by other administrations on things such as poverty.) But now-a-days, we've seen a resurgence, partly fostered by the present Administration, of a world-view in which barbarians are naturally and persistently at-the-gates, held back by warriors of various sorts (some apparently fighting in offices, armored in Loro Piana wool), who are the creätors and maintainers of civilization and thus (like Hobbes' Leviathan) not truly bound by the rules of civilization (though it is admitted that it is generally good policy for them to conform to those rules most of the time). And, within this ideology, it is not just in dealing directly with the barbarian (the enemy combatant) that the warrior is licensed — It is the Soldier, not the lawyer / Who has given us the right to a fair trial. The Soldier giveth, and the Soldier taketh away.

And, of course, as in the Middle Ages, those who have claimed the prerogatives that this ideology would grant to the warrior needn't actually have held back barbarians, or even tried to do so. They may, in fact, be more concerned to exploit the local population.

This mythology is also very much playing into the on-going Presidential election. The Republican nomination has been won by a man whose political career was founded upon military service, and who continues to be widely considered first-and-foremost as a soldier. Some conservatives have made it plain that they cannot abide by this man, but virtually all for reasons distinct from his performance as a soldier.

Walking Away

Monday, 18 February 2008

I became involved with LiveJournal some time in 2001, when LJ was little over two years old. I had been prowling the web when I came upon the journal of a young woman who had a question or questions about Java, and I answered anonymously. There was some further interaction on this score, which got me looking at LiveJournal and at its possibilities. One of the possibilities was the creätion of a community, which in my case I thought that I might use as a testing grounds for a website that I wanted (and want) to someday launch. So I registered an account in the evening of 12 June 2001.

(The woman mentioned above left LiveJournal many years ago.)

I hadn't at that time really planned to actively 'blog or to use LJ as much of a social network. But I increasingly did each. I met various people who were interesting or charming or both.

I've had some long-standing problems with LiveJournal. The greatest of these was the difference between the real rules and the statements of the alleged rules. The same act that might cause one account to be suspended for a first offense could result nothing more than a warning for another account, and sometimes the first indication of a rule change — in advance of any other notice — would be that an account were suspended.

But things have grown far worse in the last year, as Six Apart (the company that bought Danga Interactive, and thus LiveJournal, at the start of 2005) deleted about 500 journals in a panicked reäction to complaints by social activists (most of which deletions Six Apart subsequently reversed), then surreptitiously introduced interest-search censorship (about which they've subsequently stone-walled), demanded that users adopt an all-or-nothing flagging of their own entries for mature content, and effected a programme under which individual entries will be screened if others lodge complaints that they find these entries offensive.

These actions probably had their origins in a desire by Six Apart to make LiveJournal seem more wholesome so that it could more readily be sold. In any event, in early December, Six Apart revealed that it had sold LiveJournal to СУП, a company based in Russia (and with unfortunate ties to the Kremlin).

It was-and-is within the power of СУП to end these various censorships almost immediately. Instead, they declared a 100-day development plan, which new staff and the original LiveJournal team will implement, and under which, so far, all of the censorship has essentially continued. Various members of LiveJournal have persuaded themselves that, at the end of the 100 days, the LiveJournal administration will present a draft plan, developed in private session, and then have the equivalent of public hearings on the plan. That's not how these things work. At the end of the 100 days, the plan will be set-in-stone. It is not clear whether it will be openly declared as essentially fixed, or attempts will be made to further gull members. (Andrew Paulson, the president of СУП, has already been speaking in terms of the end of 2008, rather than of early March.)

The time to make it clear to the administration that censorship had to be rolled back is-or-was before the 100 days had passed. And the way to make that a had rather than a should was by making it clear that LiveJournal would be a social networking site with far less of a society, and an advertising site with far less content, because many present members would leave before they could be used to lure other members who would be comfortable with the new order. Unfortunately, there was and is no real organized resistance amongst the membership, and disorganized resistance is unlikely to act in an effective manner.

I hate walking away from LJ. There are people there who are truly dear to me, people there whom I truly admire, who gave me access to their Friends-only entries, and when my LiveJournal account is purged (now that I have deleted it), I am simply going to lose that access. And I can no longer comment to those entries (nor with my old alias to any entry). But it was time for me to leave.