{"id":7550,"date":"2015-08-23T23:10:01","date_gmt":"2015-08-24T07:10:01","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.oeconomist.com\/blogs\/daniel\/?p=7550"},"modified":"2022-07-23T02:07:24","modified_gmt":"2022-07-23T09:07:24","slug":"g_d-and-morality","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.oeconomist.com\/blogs\/daniel\/?p=7550","title":{"rendered":"Good Lord!<\/q>"},"content":{"rendered":"

[This entry is a reworking of a less carefully written entry that I posted to Facebook<\/a> on 26 March.]<\/p>

\u1f10\u03bd\u03bd\u1f79\u03b7\u03c3\u03bf\u03bd \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u1f79\u03bd\u03b4\u03b5\u0387 \u1f06\u03c1\u03b1 \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f45\u03c3\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u1f45\u03c4\u03b9 \u1f45\u03c3\u03b9\u1f79\u03bd \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f51\u03c0\u1f78 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b8\u03b5\u1ff6\u03bd, \u1f22 \u1f45\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f45\u03c3\u03b9\u1f79\u03bd \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u037e[1]<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>

Socrates
as related by Platon
in \u0395\u1f50\u03b8\u03cd\u03c6\u03c1\u03c9\u03bd<\/cite><\/a> [Euthyphro<\/cite><\/a>] 10a<\/div><\/div>

A classic question is of whether goodness — in the sense of that which is moral<\/em> or otherwise objectively to be desired<\/em> — determines the will of G_d, or is determined by the will of G_d.[2]<\/span><\/span><\/p>

The notion that whatever G_d wills is, ipso facto<\/span>, good is called the Divine Command<\/q> theory of goodness. A fair number of people profess to believe this theory, but few people actually do. One way of testing belief would be to ask, for various X<\/var>, whether it would be bad for G_d to do X<\/var>. For example, whether it would be bad for G_d to create innocent souls, and then, beginning immediately, to subject them to an eternity of unrelieved suffering. A person who reached for some theoretical greater<\/em> good somehow achieved wouldn't be accepting that G_d's will were ipso facto<\/span> good; a person who cried out that G_d would not do such a thing because<\/em> it were evil wouldn't be accepting that G_d's will were ipso facto<\/span> good. Only a person who could honestly declare that it would not be bad for G_d to do any<\/em> X<\/var> would accept the Divine Command theory.<\/p>

Phil Robertson's infamous speech<\/a>, in which he presents a hypothetical scenario within which ghastly things are done to an atheïst famly<\/span><\/a>,[3]<\/span> is an exemplar of an attempt to advance a Divine Command theory that violates<\/em> the essential<\/em> feature of that theory. Robertson presumes that atheïsm in turn implies moral nihilism<\/span>. But he also presumes that none of the things done to the family could<\/em> be good; that presumption implies that even G_d could not make them good. Robertson expects his audience — even the non-believers in his audience — to be able to see<\/em> that these assaults are actively wrong<\/em>. Indeed, he is apparently prepared to bet<\/em> that, in spite of their unbelief, atheïsts undergoing such trials would form an opinion that something about this just ain\u2019t right<\/q>.<\/p>

Well, if G_d cannot make a thing good merely by willing it to be good, then fundamental goodness is independent of the will of G_d<\/em>. And if goodness is independent of the will of G_d, then the case for goodness is independent of the will of G_d. If G_d should not do things because they are evil, then men and women should not do them because they are evil, for pretty much the same reason as G_d should not, whatever that reason might be.<\/p>

Possibly G_d might be more morally discerning<\/em> than ordinary persons. But ordinary persons plainly have great difficulty recognizing whatever principles are communicated by G_d, which is why there is so much disagreement amongst theïsts about alleged communications. Faith<\/span> is not a mechanism of discernment<\/span>; it is guessing without the guidance of evidence, and a leap of Faith can carry one in any direction. If we are not to make uneducated guesses<\/em> about morality, then we must hope that some human beings amongst us can make a case<\/em> that does not itself rely in its foundations<\/em> upon unproved assertions about what G_d declares — a case, thus, that can be made to atheïsts.<\/p>

(Hypothetically, it might be proved<\/em> that G_d were more morally discerning and had made some moral declaration the basis of which were not understood by other persons. Still, if that<\/em> proof were not apprehensible to atheïsts, then it would not be a proof by which human beings could reasonably be guided. And I certainly haven't encountered such a proof.)[3.5]<\/span><\/span><\/p>

That's not to say that the will of G_d would be irrelevant to a manifestation of ethical principles; the will of other persons can be important to such manifestations (as, for example, when I think myself morally required not to hurt the feelings of a child); and G_d would perhaps be the most important of persons. But the fundamentals<\/em> would be prior to the desires of all<\/em> persons.<\/p>

Actually, those of us who believe that morals are prior to the will of anyone have a hard time seeing any real difference between taking morality to be no more than the commands of G_d and taking morality to be no more than the commands of some other powerful party<\/em> of persons. For us, that looks like no morality at all<\/em>, just the rule of a bully or of bullies.[4]<\/span><\/span><\/p>

And, really, a belief in a morality greater than the demands of any<\/em> person is what underlies the emotional<\/em> commitment of so many atheïsts to their atheïsm. They believe that G_d would<\/em> be good, and that G_d therefore could not cause nor allow certain things to happen; but they see those things happen, and so conclude that G_d is not there<\/em>. It is an implicit and often unrecognized commitment<\/em> to morality that makes these people atheïsts.<\/strong> (A potential counter-argument to this case for atheïsm might be found in claiming that some greater good were served by the ills observed.)<\/p>

[1]<\/span> For consider such as this: Is that which is hallowed loved by the gods because it is hallowed, or is it hallowed because it is loved by the gods?<\/q><\/p>

[2]<\/span> Of course, one may more generally write and speak in terms that allow for multiple gods (as did Platon). This allows for consideration of disagreement<\/em> amongst gods, but otherwise adds nothing but verbal awkwardness and irrelevant discomfort for monotheïsts. Since I expect that a greater share of my readers will be monotheïsts rather than polytheïsts, I'll concern myself less with the discomfort of the latter.<\/p>

[3]<\/span> \u201cI\u2019ll make a bet with you. Two guys break into an atheist's home. He has a little atheist wife and two little atheist daughters. Two guys break into his home and tie him up in a chair and gag him. And then they take his two daughters in front of him and rape both of them and then shoot them and they take his wife and then decapitate her head off in front of him. And then they can look at him and say, \u2018Isn't it great that I don't have to worry about being judged? Isn't it great that there's nothing wrong with this? There's no right or wrong, now is it dude?\u2019

\u201cThen you take a sharp knife and take his manhood and hold it in front of him and say, \u2018Wouldn't it be something if this was something wrong with this? But you're the one who says there is no God, there's no right, there's no wrong, so we're just having fun. We're sick in the head, have a nice day.\u2019

\u201cIf it happened to them, they probably would say, \u2018something about this just ain't right.\u2019\u201d<\/p>

[3.5]<\/span> This parenthetic note was inserted on 31 August 2015.<\/p>

[4]<\/span> See my entry of 20 February 2008<\/a> for discussion of the notion that rights<\/em> are creäted by powerful parties<\/em>. It is unsurprising that the typical response of classical liberals and the typical response of conservatives to atheïsm should differ one from the other, given that classical liberals and conservatives have very different notions about a need for bullies in human society.<\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"[This entry is a reworking of a less carefully written entry that I posted to Facebook on 26 March.] \u1f10\u03bd\u03bd\u1f79\u03b7\u03c3\u03bf\u03bd \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u1f79\u03bd\u03b4\u03b5\u0387 \u1f06\u03c1\u03b1 \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f45\u03c3\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u1f45\u03c4\u03b9 \u1f45\u03c3\u03b9\u1f79\u03bd \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f51\u03c0\u1f78 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b8\u03b5\u1ff6\u03bd, \u1f22 \u1f45\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f45\u03c3\u03b9\u1f79\u03bd \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u037e[1]Socratesas related by Platonin \u0395\u1f50\u03b8\u03cd\u03c6\u03c1\u03c9\u03bd [Euthyphro] 10a A classic question is of whether goodness — in the sense […]","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_bbp_topic_count":0,"_bbp_reply_count":0,"_bbp_total_topic_count":0,"_bbp_total_reply_count":0,"_bbp_voice_count":0,"_bbp_anonymous_reply_count":0,"_bbp_topic_count_hidden":0,"_bbp_reply_count_hidden":0,"_bbp_forum_subforum_count":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[6,318,4],"tags":[496,1343,1294,1295,1344,1171,1342,1345],"class_list":["post-7550","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-commentary","category-ethics-philosophy","category-public","tag-atheism","tag-divine-command-theory","tag-god","tag-gods","tag-goodness","tag-morality","tag-morals","tag-the-good"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.oeconomist.com\/blogs\/daniel\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7550","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.oeconomist.com\/blogs\/daniel\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.oeconomist.com\/blogs\/daniel\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.oeconomist.com\/blogs\/daniel\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.oeconomist.com\/blogs\/daniel\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=7550"}],"version-history":[{"count":8,"href":"https:\/\/www.oeconomist.com\/blogs\/daniel\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7550\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":12041,"href":"https:\/\/www.oeconomist.com\/blogs\/daniel\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7550\/revisions\/12041"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.oeconomist.com\/blogs\/daniel\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=7550"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.oeconomist.com\/blogs\/daniel\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=7550"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.oeconomist.com\/blogs\/daniel\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=7550"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}