[This entry may be superfluous, in that people who fall for any of the fallacies discussed are unlikely to read the entry, people who employ one of the fallacies are unlikely to reform if they do read the entry, and people who recognize that fallacies are involved may not see much use to analyzing them.]<\/p>
I often encounter an argument, whose form<\/em> is<\/p> It's easy to find P<\/var>, A<\/var>1<\/sub>, and A<\/var>2<\/sub> such that the intuïtion recoils from the conclusion that<\/p> and, in the face of such intuïtions, most people will acknowledge the non sequitur<\/span> (acknowledged or otherwise) in the argument. We could even add a further premise, that<\/p> and still<\/em> find P<\/var>, A<\/var>1<\/sub>, and A<\/var>2<\/sub> such that the intuïtion recoils from that conclusion. (Consider that non-profit institutions<\/span> do facilitate child abuse<\/span>, and that child abuse is worse than many other things that are still themselves unacceptable.)<\/p> Yet one encounters this argument frequently with P<\/var> as the state<\/span>, A<\/var>2<\/sub> is something that somebody wants done (such as space exploration<\/span>) and A<\/var>1<\/sub> is something disturbing that the state is doing or has done recently.<\/p> A variation on this can be found with form<\/p> A non sequitur<\/span> is evident in cases where P<\/var>3<\/sub> is plainly no subset of P<\/var>1<\/sub>; but this argument is often presented in a manner so as to obscure a distinction, as when an However, this argument is fallacious even when P<\/var>3<\/sub> simply is<\/em> P<\/var>1<\/sub>. There may in fact be an incoherency in approving of A<\/var>1<\/sub> while objecting to A<\/var>2<\/sub>, but that inconsistency could be resolved by changing one's position on A<\/var>1<\/sub><\/em>. For example, if forcing people to pay for birth control<\/span> is better<\/em> than forcing them to pay for war with Iraq<\/span>, then perhaps someone who objects to the former should cease approving of the latter, rather than embracing the former.<\/p> (And resistance from P<\/var>1<\/sub> to coherence wouldn't itself license A<\/var>2<\/sub> when A<\/var>2<\/sub> victimizes yet some additional party P<\/var>4<\/sub>. One doesn't force atheists<\/em> to distribute copies of Al Qu'ran<\/cite> on the grounds that neoconservatives<\/em> would object to such distribution even while supporting worse things.)<\/p> Sometimes one even sees an argument of the form<\/p> Variations of this even go so far as to replace objection<\/span> with more active opposition<\/span>.<\/p> The appeal for those who present these arguments is that, if they were accepted, then almost no A<\/var>2<\/sub> could be practicably challenged, as the objector could be dismissed for not having tackled<\/em> each and every greater evil.<\/p> Of course, if this argument held, then it could virtually always be turned around against the claimant<\/em>. For every P<\/var>2<\/sub> and A<\/var>2<\/sub>, there is a P<\/var>'2<\/sub>, A<\/var>'1<\/sub>, and A<\/var>'2<\/sub> such that A<\/var>'2<\/sub> is the supposed ill addressed by A<\/var>2<\/sub>, P<\/var>'2<\/sub> effects A<\/var>'2<\/sub>, and A<\/var>'1<\/sub> is some greater ill effected by P<\/var>'2<\/sub>. In other words, even if A<\/var>2<\/sub> were good<\/em>, it would itself almost never address the greatest evil, so that there would always<\/em> be something else that one would be required to do before ever<\/em> getting to A<\/var>2<\/sub>.<\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"[This entry may be superfluous, in that people who fall for any of the fallacies discussed are unlikely to read the entry, people who employ one of the fallacies are unlikely to reform if they do read the entry, and people who recognize that fallacies are involved may not see much use to analyzing them.] […]","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_bbp_topic_count":0,"_bbp_reply_count":0,"_bbp_total_topic_count":0,"_bbp_total_reply_count":0,"_bbp_voice_count":0,"_bbp_anonymous_reply_count":0,"_bbp_topic_count_hidden":0,"_bbp_reply_count_hidden":0,"_bbp_forum_subforum_count":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[6,720,318,9,175],"tags":[202,1129,302],"class_list":["post-5765","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-commentary","category-epistemology","category-ethics-philosophy","category-ideology-philosophy","category-philosophy","tag-everyday-frustrations","tag-fallacies","tag-logic"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.oeconomist.com\/blogs\/daniel\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5765","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.oeconomist.com\/blogs\/daniel\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.oeconomist.com\/blogs\/daniel\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.oeconomist.com\/blogs\/daniel\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.oeconomist.com\/blogs\/daniel\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=5765"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/www.oeconomist.com\/blogs\/daniel\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5765\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":11803,"href":"https:\/\/www.oeconomist.com\/blogs\/daniel\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5765\/revisions\/11803"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.oeconomist.com\/blogs\/daniel\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=5765"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.oeconomist.com\/blogs\/daniel\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=5765"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.oeconomist.com\/blogs\/daniel\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=5765"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}P<\/var> does A<\/var>1<\/sub>;
A<\/var>2<\/sub> is better than A<\/var>1<\/sub>;
therefore it would be acceptable\/desirable for P<\/var> to do A<\/var>2<\/sub>.<\/blockquote> it would be acceptable\/desirable for P<\/var> to do A<\/var>2<\/sub>.<\/blockquote>
P<\/var> ought to be persistently active (if not necessarily in their present manner).<\/blockquote>
P<\/var>1<\/sub> approves when P<\/var>2<\/sub> does A<\/var>1<\/sub>;
A<\/var>2<\/sub> is better than A<\/var>1<\/sub>;
therefore P<\/var>3<\/sub> should not object to P<\/var>2<\/sub> doing A<\/var>2<\/sub>.<\/blockquote> everyone<\/q> or a
no one<\/q> is used as-if loosely (which is to say inaccurately<\/em>) in the first premise, but P<\/var>3<\/sub> is some person or group of persons who aren't actually in the set labelled
everyone<\/q> or actually are in a non-empty set labelled
no one<\/q>.<\/p>
P<\/var>1<\/sub> does not object<\/u> when P<\/var>2<\/sub> does A<\/var>1<\/sub>;
A<\/var>2<\/sub> is better than A<\/var>1<\/sub>;
therefore P<\/var>3<\/sub> should not object to P<\/var>2<\/sub> doing A<\/var>2<\/sub>.<\/blockquote> P<\/var>1<\/sub> does not actively oppose<\/u> P<\/var>2<\/sub> doing A<\/var>1<\/sub>;
A<\/var>2<\/sub> is better than A<\/var>1<\/sub>;
therefore P<\/var>3<\/sub> should not actively oppose P<\/var>2<\/sub> doing A<\/var>2<\/sub>.<\/blockquote>