{"id":11813,"date":"2021-09-02T21:39:00","date_gmt":"2021-09-03T04:39:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.oeconomist.com\/blogs\/daniel\/?p=11813"},"modified":"2023-03-02T16:17:39","modified_gmt":"2023-03-03T00:17:39","slug":"basic-ontology","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.oeconomist.com\/blogs\/daniel\/?p=11813","title":{"rendered":"Basic Ontology"},"content":{"rendered":"

When natural languages first had need to refer to concepts<\/span> as such, this need was so limited and so vaguely understood that the very same term would refer both to a concept<\/span> and to that to which the concept<\/span> pointed. A horse is a mammal.<\/span> and A horse is on my lawn.<\/span> seem superficially to be statements of the same sort. Some people, sensing a difference, declare that the first statement is essential<\/span>, while the second is accidental<\/span>, but this way of speaking and of writing seems to treat a horse<\/q> as referring in both cases to the same thing, and embroils us in conflicts<\/em> over which attributes are essential<\/span>, which are accidental<\/span>, and by what methods we all ought to agree on a resolution. The primary difference between the two statements is that in A horse is a mammal.<\/span> the term a horse<\/q> typically refers to a concept<\/span>, whereäs in A horse is on my lawn.<\/span> the term a horse<\/q> usually refers to something to which the concept corresponds, which we may call an instantiation<\/q> of the concept<\/span>.<\/p>

I say usually<\/q> because in theory someone might use a horse<\/q> only for creatures who were, amongst other things, found on her lawn; but we understand that this practice is not usual, and can find the difference between concept<\/span> and instantiation<\/span> by considering usual practice. At the same time, we can see that struggles about essential<\/span> and accidental<\/span> attributes are largely rooted in different people simply using related but different concepts<\/span>.<\/p>

Even people who are careful to indicate a distinction between some Y<\/var> and the concept<\/span> of Y<\/var> when Y<\/var> is not itself a concept<\/span> may fail to do so when it is. But the concept<\/span> of the concept<\/span> of X<\/var> is not the concept<\/span> of X<\/var> unless we can find some X<\/var> which is no more or less than the idea<\/em> of itself.<\/p>

From this point, we should see that, to believe that instantiations<\/span> depend<\/em> upon their concepts<\/span>, we must accept an infinite regress<\/em>. The alternative is not to accept that concepts<\/span> depend upon that which instantiates<\/span> them — some concepts<\/span> are not instantiated<\/span> — but to understand that concepts<\/span> must be constructed by employing some thing or things that are not concepts<\/span>.<\/p>

In any case, always marking the distinction between concept<\/span> and instantiation<\/span> can become a very great burden as we begin to ponder ideas as such<\/em>, part of which burden would fall upon a reader dealing with compounding of expressions such as the concept of<\/q>; but, one way or another, we should remember what we are contemplating or discussing.<\/p>

The confusion in using the same term for concept<\/span> and instantiation<\/span> is most acute in existence<\/span> statements.<\/p>

The subject<\/em> in Unicorns do not exist.<\/span> is the concept<\/span> of unicorns, not any instantiation<\/span> of that concept<\/span>. Grammatically<\/em> we treat nothing<\/span> as a something and grammatically<\/em> we treat non-existence<\/span> as a property of nothing-as-something. But, underlying this practice, statements about non-existence are really statements that some concepts<\/span> have no instantiations<\/span>; if claims about non-existence<\/q> refer to properties of somethings<\/em>, then these somethings are concepts<\/span>. Unicorns do not exist.<\/q> is not really about unicorns; it is about the idea<\/em> of unicorns. We can only speak or write of the idea<\/em> of unicorns.<\/p>

And, when we speak or write of existence<\/span>, we are speaking and writing of concepts<\/span>. The claim Horses exist.<\/span> is really about the concept<\/span>, that it is instantiated<\/span>. Coherent existential claims are no more or less than claims that concepts<\/span> are instantiated<\/span>.<\/p>

That statements of form X<\/var> exists.<\/span> unpack to form The concept<\/span> of X<\/var> is instantiated<\/span>.<\/span> should lead one to recognize that a proper reading of The concept<\/span> of X<\/var><\/u> exists<\/span>.<\/span> unpacks to The concept<\/span> of the concept<\/span> of X<\/var><\/u> is instantiated<\/span>.<\/span> We don't<\/em> generally need a concept<\/span> before we use something that would instantiate<\/span> it — otherwise the infinite regress of concepts<\/span> would be needed — but anything that we use is at least potentially an instantiation<\/span> of multiple<\/em> concepts<\/span>. Some might be tempted to conclude that, thus, X<\/var> exists.<\/span> needn't refer to the concept<\/span> of X<\/var>, and can be unpacked as X<\/var> is potentially an instantiation<\/span> of some concept<\/span>.<\/span> It may seem doubtful that anyone has ever previously intended such a thing with an existential claim, and certainly existential claims are not usually claims about the ability to find or to construct an idea of a thing said to exist. However, to be potentially an instantiation<\/span> of some concept<\/span> is no more or less than to possess properties<\/span>, so this notion would treat existence<\/span> as something like<\/em> a generalization of the concept<\/span> of property<\/span>. Still, the formula cannot be adapted to X<\/var> does not exist.<\/span> as unpacking it to X<\/var> is not potentially an instantiation<\/span> of some concept<\/span>.<\/span> is always incoherent when not false, whereäs declarations such as Unicorns do not exist.<\/span> may be coherent and true. And we are incoherent if by a horse<\/q> we mean the same thing in A horse has no properties.<\/span> as in A horse is on the lawn.<\/span><\/p>

I don't propose that we try to reshape our speech and writing nor our work-a-day thinking to distinguish overtly-and-always concept<\/span> from instantiation<\/span>. I don't even propose to do so in all philosophic discourse. But, when discussion of existence seems troubling or profound or both, then we may need to bring that distinction to bear.<\/p>

Some people, encountering a discussion such as the foregoing, will not much attend to it, because they feel certain that they clearly see a truth that contradicts it. I'm going to address propositions of two sorts, mistaken for such truth.<\/p>

One sort, in which X<\/var> is something like what is meant by a horse<\/q> in A horse is on the lawn.<\/q> says X<\/var> V<\/var> because it exists<\/u>.<\/span> where the variable V<\/var> takes the value of a verb. For example, A hot stove<\/u> burns you<\/u> because it exists.<\/span> The first thing to note is that specific values of V<\/var> that supposedly prove existence<\/span> aren't universally applicable; we don't<\/em> say A horse burns you because it exists.<\/span> Generally, existence<\/span> is intended to be seen as a necessary<\/em> but not sufficient<\/em> condition for X<\/var> to V<\/var>. But, when we add<\/em> conditions to achieve sufficiency, we find that the added conditions (eg<\/abbr><\/span>, being at a temperature at or above 118°F) are by themselves<\/em> sufficient, without a mysterious complementary property<\/span> of existence<\/span> possessed by X<\/var>; the notion of such a property<\/span> results from thoughtlessly confusing a way in which a concept<\/span> of X<\/var> may be said to have properties<\/span> with the way in which X<\/var> has properties<\/span>. What we call the horn<\/q> of a unicorn is itself a concept<\/span> of a horn.<\/p>

Though I have encountered at least one would-be follower of Ayn Rand who mistook the tack of because it exists<\/q> for hers, she made a different mistake. She declared the concept of existence<\/span> to be irreducible<\/em> but axiomatic<\/span>, and that we were to see that it were found and proven<\/em> in-so-far as a self-contradiction would result from denying Existence exists.<\/span> However, because we can show that a self-contradiction indeed obtains while interpretting existence<\/q> and its coördinate terms as in the prior discussion, her attempt to prove the existence<\/span> of some other concept<\/span> (profound or otherwise) is a failure.<\/p>

If we unpack Existence exists.<\/q> as we can, it is The concept<\/span> of being an instantiated<\/span> concept<\/span> is instantiated<\/span>.<\/span> The source of self-contradiction in denial of this proposition is that the concept<\/span> of a concept<\/span> being instantiated<\/span> must have been instantiated<\/span> for the proposition to be formed, though this proposition could not hold before formation of the concept<\/span> of existence<\/span>. And its subjects<\/em> are not of the sort that Rand and her followers imagined or imagine.<\/p>

For whatever it's worth, if we grab for potential instantiation<\/span> then the unpacking is to The concept<\/span> of potential instantiation<\/span> is potentially instantiated<\/span>.<\/span> that is, more simply put, to A concept<\/span> can be formed of being the subject of a concept<\/span>.<\/span> Again, self-contradiction ensues if we attempt to deny the claim, but in neither expression is the subject for which Rand reached.<\/p> ","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"When natural languages first had need to refer to concepts as such, this need was so limited and so vaguely understood that the very same term would refer both to a concept and to that to which the concept pointed. A horse is a mammal. and A horse is on my lawn. seem superficially to […]","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_bbp_topic_count":0,"_bbp_reply_count":0,"_bbp_total_topic_count":0,"_bbp_total_reply_count":0,"_bbp_voice_count":0,"_bbp_anonymous_reply_count":0,"_bbp_topic_count_hidden":0,"_bbp_reply_count_hidden":0,"_bbp_forum_subforum_count":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[6,719,4],"tags":[1595,1597,1598,1600],"class_list":["post-11813","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-commentary","category-metaphysics","category-public","tag-being","tag-existence","tag-first-philosophy","tag-ontology"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.oeconomist.com\/blogs\/daniel\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/11813","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.oeconomist.com\/blogs\/daniel\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.oeconomist.com\/blogs\/daniel\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.oeconomist.com\/blogs\/daniel\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.oeconomist.com\/blogs\/daniel\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=11813"}],"version-history":[{"count":4,"href":"https:\/\/www.oeconomist.com\/blogs\/daniel\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/11813\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":12113,"href":"https:\/\/www.oeconomist.com\/blogs\/daniel\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/11813\/revisions\/12113"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.oeconomist.com\/blogs\/daniel\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=11813"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.oeconomist.com\/blogs\/daniel\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=11813"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.oeconomist.com\/blogs\/daniel\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=11813"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}